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4.1  Introduction 
 The main impediment to science integration in the study of resource management, 
not only between various social scientifi c disciplines but also between the social and 
the physical sciences more generally, is a refusal of social scientists to appreciate 
how deeply the societal sphere is embedded in wider biophysical and social- 
ecological systems. Recently, however, researchers working at the intersection 
between human and natural systems have come to acknowledge that society is inex-
tricably embedded in, and constrained by, wider ecological systems including the 
earth system as a whole. This research program is commonly called the social- 
ecological, socio-metabolic, or earth-systems perspective (Berkes et al.  2003 ; 
Walker et al.  2004 ; Haberl et al.  2011 ; Bierman et al.  2012 ), and it undeniably holds 
signifi cant promise for the study of resource management. 
 It is important to note, however, that integrating a social with a biophysical per-
spective is not new if we take the long view of the history of science. This is not a 
problem in and of itself, as science is always a kind of palimpsest. But since amnesia 
can also hamper the development of new ideas, it is worthwhile for those interested 
in a social-ecological systems perspective and other related research programs to 
scrutinize earlier traditions for potentially useful contributions. 
 Indeed, the linkages between natural resources and social change were studied 
long before the separation between physical and human sciences, and the subse-
quent specialization of social science into various academic disciplines. Take for 
example the  physiocrats of the eighteenth century, who emphasized that all economic 
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wealth is ultimately derived from a land base. In the present chapter, I focus on 
another early integrated framework, namely the tradition founded by the enlighten-
ment polymath Thomas Malthus (1766–1834). Malthus was versed in an impressive 
array of areas, from theology to philosophy and from population analysis to the 
emerging fi eld of political economy. He integrated all of these disparate fi elds of 
knowledge in order to study the interaction between population dynamics and food 
production, including the social consequences of that interaction. 
 Today, Malthus’ determination to integrate whatever fi eld of knowledge had 
something to contribute to the issues under study is a source of inspiration to all 
those who want to take a genuinely integrated look at resource management. As we 
will see, modifi ed Malthusian theories constitute a uniquely promising bid for 
grounding the study of resource management on science integration, not only 
between various social scientifi c disciplines but also between the social and the 
lages between population dynamics, food production, and social change, modifi ed 
Malthusian theories go beyond his original framework. The most sophisticated 
models are equipped to consider  any kind of resource constraint and incorporate 
 any challenge to the ecosphere, from biodiversity loss to climate change. 
 Despite the considerable potential of modifi ed Malthusian theories, most social 
scientists have a hard time accepting that social change can be anything but endog-
enous. Physical scientists are more open to Malthusian hypotheses, but their social 
theorizing often lacks sophistication and is therefore duly criticized. 
 To overcome this unproductive state of affairs, I start from the classical 
Malthusian framework and gradually add complexity to it. After an introduction 
and discussion of classical Malthusianism I show how, despite the failing of 
Malthusian predictions, its logical structure is reproduced by simple neo-Mal-
thusian theories that have been developed to account for contemporary global 
challenges. Subsequently, I show the potential of more sophisticated neo-Mal-
thusian models and theories, from the iconic  Limits to Growth study in the 1970s 
to the eco-scarcity theory of the 1990s and from climate-based eco-scarcity to 
Tainter’s theory of diminishing returns on civilizational complexity. I conclude 
by pondering the prospects of modifi ed Malthusian theories contributing to bet-
ter science integration. 
4.2  Classical Malthusianism 
 The original theory of Thomas Malthus is neatly summarized by an oft-quoted 
statement from the  Essay on the Principle of Population : “Population, when 
unchecked, increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence increases only in an arith-
metical ratio” ( 1798 , 14). Population is assumed to grow exponentially, but the 
growth of a society’s means of subsistence is assumed to be only linear. If this is so, 
exponential growth of population unavoidably outpaces the linear increase of sub-
sistence. Alas, population levels are constrained by food supply as people need 
enough food. Tragically, food intake per capita shrinks as population grows faster 
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than subsistence. Linear growth in food supply cannot make up for the skyrocketing 
needs of the exponentially growing population. At some point, population growth 
runs against the limit imposed by minimum food intake per capita. 
 In a society characterized by social inequality, the poorest of the poor will be 
the fi rst to feel the looming food scarcity. As population levels rise and food per 
capita decreases, the food available to the poor will fall below the minimum 
intake that is necessary for their subsistence. Redistribution can keep the poor fed 
for a while, but this will not prevent more and more people from becoming des-
titute due to the inexorable fall of food per capita. In the end, the system is likely 
to be readjusted by brutal mechanisms such as famine, war, and pandemics. 
 Logically speaking, another solution would be to limit population growth to 
“arithmetical ratio” in line with the linear growth of food production. In practical 
terms, this would mean birth control. To Malthus, who was an Anglican country 
curate and a moralist, family planning and any kind of sex without the aim of repro-
duction came under the category of sinful behavior. He therefore advocated volun-
tary forms of “moral restraint”, but at the same time believed that curtailing the 
reproductive instinct of the masses was simply not realistic. 
 During his lifetime, Malthus modifi ed his theory several times: fi rst in the 
 two- volume version of the  Essay ( 1803 ) and then in various further editions (Winch 
 1987 ). These modifi cations need not detain us here, as they left the basic theory in 
place. Nor is there any need to dwell on the fi ner points of the theory or its policy 
implications, which were important during the nineteenth-century debate about the 
poor laws. For our present purposes, we are only interested in the logical structure 
of the theory and its applicability to issues of resource management. 
 The enduring appeal of the theory is mostly due to its plausible assumptions and 
axiomatic elegance. It is indeed plausible to assume that population grows by an 
annual rate multiplied by current numbers—much like the stock on a bank account 
grows by the iterative application of an interest rate. The result of compound inter-
est, or of children and children’s children following the reproductive behavior of 
their forefathers, is exponential growth. Similarly, it appears plausible to assume 
linear growth for a population’s means of subsistence because agricultural innova-
tion and other improvements in food production tend to happen in an incremental 
fashion, suggesting linear progress rather than a self-reinforcing mechanism. This 
appears much more plausible than to assume that improvements in food production 
are like a compound interest rate applied over a stock. 
 There is an important element missing from the account, or rather implicit in it: 
namely the notion of  overshoot . Overshoot means that a system can temporarily 
exceed its long-term limits. Malthus assumed that this was indeed possible. 
Otherwise, why did he assume that population levels would be readjusted through 
“vice and misery”—shorthand for famine, war, pandemics, and sinful behavior— 
rather than simply being limited by minimum food intake per capita? In fact, “vice 
and misery” are unavoidable only insofar as population can temporarily exceed sub-
sistence. Plain commonsense has it that this can easily happen. Population levels 
may exceed agricultural yields during years of good harvest, but the famine bound 
to occur in a later year of bad harvest will then be even more catastrophic. Malthus 
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assumed that such misery was likely to be accompanied by war and pandemics, as 
well as objectionable forms of non-reproductive sex, or “vice”. 
 To illustrate the axiomatic elegance of the theory, consider Fig.  4.1 .
4.2.1  The Logical Structure of Malthusianism 
 Malthusianism is more than simply a theory about the social interaction effects of 
population dynamics and food production. Logically speaking, it is the study of how 
different functions, which are all essential to social production and reproduction, 
enable and constrain each other. In abstract formal terms, this logical structure can 
be visually expressed by the following general scheme (Fig.  4.2 ).
 At the heart of the model, there are two functions which are both vital to social 
production and reproduction. The fi rst function (ƒ 1 ) outpaces and strains the second 
one (ƒ 2 ). For a while, this is obfuscated by the fact that time lags built into the sys-
tem enable a temporary overshoot. In the long run, however, there is an inexorable 
mechanism by which the second function (ƒ 2 ) constrains the fi rst one (ƒ 1 ). The way 
the mechanism operates is that the decline of ƒ 2 leads to signifi cant problems, which 
at the end of the day disrupt the unsustainable growth of ƒ 1 . 
 As we have seen, in classical Malthusianism population growth (ƒ 1 ) outpaces and 
strains food supply (ƒ 2 ) because the former function is exponential while the latter 
is only linear. Overshoot is possible for a while, for example due to a series of good 
harvests. In the long run, however, food supply (ƒ 2 ) inexorably constrains popula-
tion growth (ƒ 1 ) because caloric intake per capita cannot fall below subsistence 
level. Famine and other calamities are then unavoidable. According to Malthus, 
























4.2.2  Why Malthus Was Wrong 
 The theory is axiomatically true if one assumes, with Malthus, that the growth of 
food production is at best linear while population growth is inherently exponential. 
Or, more mildly, if one assumes that population growth outpaces but is ultimately 
constrained by the means of subsistence. Quite obviously, this is not how modern 
history has unfolded. So far, overpopulation has neither led to mass starvation nor 
to planetary pandemics or other forms of catastrophic rebalancing. 
 With hindsight, there are four reasons why Malthus has not been vindicated. 
First, his assumption of exponential population growth was largely correct at the 
time but is less so today. As a result of the so-called demographic transition, world 
population is moving away from familiar patterns of exponential growth. It is still 
projected to grow by another two billion people, from around seven billion in 2011 
to about nine billion in 2050. But, at the same time, population growth has started 
to level off in most parts of the world (Lutz and Samir  2010 ; UN  2011 ). 
 Second, growth in food production has been far more than linear. Since the 
 nineteenth century, industrial inputs such as chemical fertilizer and motorized 
machinery have dramatically intensifi ed agricultural productivity. Thanks to an 
abundant supply of such inputs, food production has been largely able to keep pace 
with population growth. For the last couple of centuries, agricultural innovation has 
eluded Malthusian predictions over and over again (Trewavas  2002 ). 
 Third, globalization has enabled an unprecedented growth of both world 
 population and food production. In line with circumstances in the early modern 
period, Malthus saw population levels as constrained by food production at the 
local level. Over the last two centuries, however, mobility and trade have shifted 

















 Fig. 4.2  The logical structure of Malthusianism 
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the international, and fi nally to the global level. To begin with, Europeans were 
able to move to “underpopulated” landmasses such as America and Siberia and 
to import raw materials and foodstuffs from the colonies. Subsequently the glo-
balization of trade, and more recently of aid, has had similar effects, although in 
the reverse direction, buttressing indigenous population levels in developing 
countries. 
 Fourth, vulgar forms of Malthusianism tend to assume that any given resource 
base can sustain only a fi xed number of individuals of some species, commonly 
called  carrying capacity . For example, wild deer can for some time overgraze 
the available herbs on an island, but their population level will inevitably be 
adjusted downward to carrying capacity after a period of overshoot. While this 
notion of carrying capacity is suitable for simple cases of population biology, 
for example algal growth constrained by the surface of a lake, it is far too static 
for the study of more complex constellations. 1 When applied to human popula-
tions, carrying capacity can only be understood as a dynamic cultural concept, 
depending  inter alia on technological innovation and social choice (Cohen 
 1995 ; Seidl and Tisdell  1999 ). The carrying capacity for irrigation agriculture is 
higher than for rain-fed agriculture, and the carrying capacity for a population 
of vegans riding on bicycles is higher than for a population of meat lovers driv-
ing about in SUVs. 
4.2.3  Why Malthus May Still Turn Out to Be Right 
 Today, industrial civilization is buttressing a globalized system that injects trade and 
aid to some of the most vulnerable parts of the world, which would otherwise suffer 
serious problems of overpopulation. In our globalized world, even the poorest coun-
tries are embedded in industrial civilization, both by virtue of transnational interde-
pendence and through governmental links such as development aid and military 
intervention. This does not always apply to the extent desirable from a humanitarian 
viewpoint, but in most places and most of the time Malthusian scenarios are suc-
cessfully prevented by world industrial civilization. 
 Alas, this applies only as long as world industrial civilization is in a position 
to bail out places affl icted by overpopulation. In a way, the industrial era with 
its enormous energy inputs and technological inventiveness may have created a 
“fool’s paradise” which temporarily abrogates the worst effects of overpopula-
tion. Once industrial civilization enters a terminal decline, Malthusian fears 
may still be vindicated after all (for the “worst case”, see Duncan  1993 ,  2001 , 
 2005 ,  2007 ). 
1
  Even in the case of wild deer, overshoot may lead to a lowering of overall carrying capacity due 
to various forms of ecological damage. For example, after a cycle of overgrazing an island may be 
able to sustain fewer deer than previously. 
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4.2.4  Science Integration 
 For our present purposes, classical Malthusianism is interesting not only as an 
 intuitively plausible and axiomatically elegant theoretical model to study important 
phenomena, but also as a paradigm case of science integration. At its core, classical 
Malthusianism deals with a wide array of vexing ethical and empirical questions 
pertaining to multiple areas of knowledge, connecting the physical and human 
 sciences and spanning various social scientifi c disciplines. 
 Let me simply list a selection of the questions broached and scientifi c disci-
plines involved. What are the empirical patterns driving population growth, and 
how do they operate at the level of individual reproductive choices (population 
biology, human demography)? How is subsistence affected by various regimes of 
technological innovation and social distribution, and how is it impacted by a 
population’s level of affl uence and food habits such as meat consumption versus 
vegetarianism (agronomy; food studies)? At what point must a specifi c territory 
be considered overpopulated, taking account of the fact that trade and aid can 
support very high levels of population density in urban areas and countries 
receiving an infl ow of food and other means of subsistence (economics; develop-
ment studies)? Which social and political mechanisms are triggered by over-
population, and under what circumstances (comparative sociology; political 
science)? When is there a serious risk of population pressure leading to a pan-
demic (epidemiology)? 
4.3  Simple Neo-Malthusian Theories 
 Simple neo-Malthusian theories apply the logical structure of classical 
Malthusianism to other important issues of resource management. Like classical 
Malthusianism, they have a certain commonsensical appeal due to their plausi-
ble assumptions and axiomatic elegance. Simple neo-Malthusian theories there-
fore often play a powerful role in the popular imagination, although more often 
than not without any direct reference to classical Malthusianism as the source of 
the tradition. 
4.3.1  Environmental Neo-Malthusianism 
 Environmental neo-Malthusianism is a typical case in point. According to this 
school, environmental impact (ƒ 1 ) such as land degradation and biodiversity loss 
outpaces and strains nature’s ability to provide ecosystem services (ƒ 2 ) such as bio-
mass production and carbon sequestration. The reason is that environmental impact 
constantly increases, while ecosystem services are either stagnant or declining. 
After a period of overshoot, the decline of ecosystem services inexorably leads to 
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environmental degradation, undermining the Earth’s regenerative capacity. This 
must lead to catastrophic consequences, constraining humanity’s ability to make 
further demands on ecosystems and ultimately rebalancing environmental impact 
with nature’s ability to provide ecosystem services (Fig.  4.3 ).
 Environmental neo-Malthusianism is neatly illustrated by ecological footprint 
analysis, as in the World Wildlife Fund’s  Living Planet Report (WWF  2012 ). 2 The 
report closely follows the neo-Malthusian template, with ecological footprint out-
pacing and straining biocapacity but ultimately constrained by it. 
 Ecological footprint (ƒ 1 ) is a measure of environmental impact. It is understood 
as the land base that would be required to compensate for a given level of environ-
mental impact, most notably greenhouse gas emissions. It is based on the so-called 
IPAT equation, which specifi es environmental impact in terms of population, affl u-
ence, and technology (Ehrlich and Holdren  1971 ). The equation has seen many 
specifi cations over the years (Chertow  2000 ). 3 To cite just one prominent example, 
Ehrlich et al. ( 1999 , 270) defi ne environmental impact (I) as:
 a product of population size (P), per capita affl uence (A) measured as per capita con-
sumption, and the environmental impact of the technologies, cultural practices, and 
institutions through which that consumption is serviced (T), measured as damage per 
unit of consumption. 
2
  Ecological footprint analysis goes back to Wackernagel and Rees ( 1996 ) and is also applied by 
the Global Footprint Network (Ewing et al.  2010 ). 
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although it is better understood as a complex function allowing for interaction effects between its variables 



























 Biocapacity (ƒ 2 ) is a measure of ecosystem services. It is defi ned as “[t]he  capacity 
of ecosystems to produce useful biological materials and to absorb waste materials 
generated by humans” (WWF  2012 , 146). 4 Ecological footprint constrains biocapacity 
insofar as, after a period of overshoot, the overburdening of biocapacity by ecological 
footprint must lead to dismal consequences such as land degradation and climate 
change, which in turn must lead to signifi cant social calamities: environmental 
migration, resource wars, pandemics, and so on. Short of a sustainability transforma-
tion, such calamities may be the only way for ecological footprint and biocapacity to 
return to a long-term global equilibrium. 
4.3.2  Climate-Based Neo-Malthusianism 
 In climate-based neo-Malthusianism (Fig.  4.4 ), climatic stress (ƒ 1 ) is understood in 
terms of atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, most notably CO 2 . 
Climatic resilience (ƒ 2 ) is almost impossible to measure, but it is usually understood 
as the ability of the climate system to absorb stresses without exceeding an envelope 
of change deemed acceptable to human society, such as a maximum global warming 
4
  Biocapacity is understood here as a specifi c ecosystem service, namely the bioproductivity of the 
earth. It is operationalized as the average bioproductivity of a “global hectare”, multiplied by the 



























 Fig. 4.4  Climate-based neo-Malthusianism 
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of 2 °C. To the extent that, at the global level, greenhouse gas emissions are an 
unavoidable collateral of economic growth (Peters et al.  2012 ), climatic stresses are 
destined to outpace climatic resilience. Despite considerable time lags in the 
climate system, climate-based neo-Malthusians warn that the erosion of climatic 
resilience is destined to operate as a constraint on tolerable levels of climatic stress. 
When unchecked, climate change is expected to lead to a variety of social and politi-
cal disasters that may eventually force a concomitant reduction of climatic stress 
(Dyer  2010 ; Welzer  2011 ). 5 
4.3.3  Energy-Based Neo-Malthusianism 
 Energy-based neo-Malthusians (Fig.  4.5 ) emphasize, fi rst, that energy consumption 
(ƒ 1 ) is a fundamental precondition for economic growth. Second, they point out that 
energy consumption is constrained by the availability of energy reserves (ƒ 2 ). They 
further claim that energy reserves are unavoidably depleted due to their fi nite nature. 
Therefore, energy consumption has an inherent tendency to outpace the ability to 
extract declining energy reserves, with the latter ultimately constraining the former. 
Insofar as economic growth and human subsistence are tightly linked with energy 
consumption, energy scarcity will ultimately reverse the growth trajectory and lead 
to the demise of industrial civilization. This in turn will lead to all sorts of social and 
political calamities while at the same time constraining future energy consumption 
(Hubbert  1993 ; Heinberg  2003 ; Kunstler  2005 ).
5
 As indicated by the dashed arrow, however, climate change itself may tragically reinforce climatic 

























4.3.4  Critique of Simple Neo-Malthusianism 
 Simple neo-Malthusian theories are problematic precisely because they are so simple. 
For example, it is only a half-truth that economic growth and CO 2 emissions, as well 
as economic growth and energy consumption, are inextricably linked, as techno-
logical innovation can weaken that link by reducing the carbon and energy intensity 
of GDP. Similarly, it is only a half-truth that energy production is inextricably linked 
to CO 2 emissions and resource depletion: this appears to be true in the case of non-
renewable but not renewable sources of energy. Expanding the share of renewable 
energy such as solar and wind can weaken the link between economic growth, 
resource depletion, and climate change. 
4.4  Complex Neo-Malthusian Theories 
 While simple Malthusian theories are limited to the examination of only a couple of 
functions and the way they outpace and constrain one another, more complex forms 
of neo-Malthusianism explore how a variety of different trajectories mutually 
enable and/or constrain each other. This is not to deny that Thomas Malthus has 
been so much discredited by his detractors that only few modifi ed Malthusian theories 
openly claim a Malthusian lineage. Based on the logical structure of Malthusianism, 
however, it is easily possible to identify Malthusian theories even where their com-
plexity goes beyond the original framework. 
4.4.1  Limits to Growth 
 In 1972, a group of MIT researchers around Dennis Meadows applied a complex 
neo-Malthusian framework to the planetary level and used the emerging method of 
computer-driven system dynamics, developed by Jay Forrester, to examine the earth 
system as a whole. In their iconic study  The Limits to Growth and its two sequels, 
they compellingly demonstrated that exponential growth on a fi nite planet is impos-
sible in the long run (Meadows et al.  1972 ,  1992 ,  2004 ). 6 
 Meadows and colleagues found that, for a while, the growth of various parameters 
such as world population, resource consumption, and environmental pollution may 
appear to defy physical limits, but only until the systemic feedbacks kick in. In the 
long run, as resource depletion and/or pollution exceed physical limits, an abrupt 
decline or indeed collapse of industrial society is the only way for the world system 
to return to equilibrium. The delay between temporary overshoot and ultimate 
collapse is due to the fact that there are various time lags between anthropogenic 
6
  For a related warning, see Ehrlich and Ehrlich ( 2004 ); see also Bardi ( 2011 ). 
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causes such as resource depletion and greenhouse gas emissions, and systemic out-
comes such as energy scarcity and climate change. 
 The diagnosis of  The Limits to Growth is a systemic pattern of exponential 
growth, overshoot, and collapse. Contrary to what their detractors sometimes sur-
mise, Meadows and colleagues did not envision imminent doom. On the contrary, 
their baseline model, called “standard run”, displays a continued pattern of expo-
nential growth and overshoot until about 2010 or 2020, followed by the onset of 
systemic collapse between 2020 and 2050 (Fig.  4.6 ). 7 
 The end result of the standard run scenario is a contraction of world population 
to the level of about 1960 by 2100. 8 Shockingly, this implies a dramatic decline by 
more than two billion people from current levels. However this decline would not 
happen by starvation alone, as it would occur over several generations and other 
demographic factors would also play a role: lower birth rates, pandemics, declining 
life expectancy driven by failing healthcare systems, and so on. 
 As the model suggests, it is perfectly possible for industrial civilization to “over-
shoot” and exceed planetary limits for a limited period of time. In the long run, 
however, no society, and much less the human race as a whole, can live beyond their 
means. No matter how recklessly we tap into the resources of the earth crust to sus-
tain our unsustainable lifestyles, the improvement of our economic welfare and the 
increment on global carrying capacity are only temporary. 
7
  The model is on track with historical data (Turner  2008 ; Hall and Day  2009 ). 
8
  In the original version ( 1972 , 124), the projected contraction of world population by 2010 was 
“only” to the level of about 1980. 
 Fig. 4.6  World model standard run (Source: Meadows et al. ( 2004 , 169). Despite some updating, 




4.4.2  Eco-scarcity Theory 
 Another complex version of neo-Malthusianism is “eco-scarcity theory”, whereby 
land degradation and other environmental strains combine with population pressure 
to unleash Malthusian scenarios of social confl ict and political disorder. 
 Eco-scarcity began in the 1990s with confl ict theorists suggesting complex 
causal links between environmental pressure, defi ned as scarcities of renewable 
resources, and the outbreak of violent confl ict. 9 Their strategy was to collect case 
studies substantiating the claim that, particularly in overpopulated developing coun-
tries, environmental pressure can lead to the outbreak of violence. Two ample col-
lections of case studies were produced roughly at the same time, one by a Canadian 
team (Homer-Dixon  1994 ,  1999 ) and the other by a team based in Switzerland 
(Bächler et al.  1996 ). Both of these teams focused on developing countries, and both 
had the aim of tracing the social processes leading from environmental scarcity, 
eventually combined with population pressure, to the outbreak of violent confl ict. 
Thomas Homer-Dixon ( 1994 , 31), the leader of the Canadian team, presented these 
“mechanisms” in a neat causal model (Fig.  4.7 ). 10 
 According to the model, environmental scarcity is triggered by a combination of 
population growth and excessive strain on some dwindling renewable resource, 
typically exacerbated by unequal access to that resource. Together with the direct 
effects of the scarcity itself, the ensuing economic crisis engenders the forcible dis-
placement of people and/or their voluntary emigration. The result is social segrega-
tion and a weakening of state structures, both in the country affected by the scarcity 
and in neighboring countries targeted by a massive infl ow of migrants. In some 
cases this may lead to a coup d’état or even state collapse. 
9
  For a recent survey, see Bernauer et al. ( 2012 ); see also Mildner et al. ( 2011 ). 
10






















 Fig. 4.7  Causal pathways from environmental scarcity to violent confl ict 
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 All of this increases the risk of confl ict in two different ways. First, scarcity- driven 
migration may provoke violent clashes between the migrant population displaced by 
environmental pressure and the recipient population (ethnic confl icts). Second, the 
economic crisis in the area immediately affected by the scarcity, combined with a 
declining ability of the state to manage the crisis, can lead to an insurgency of citizens 
who feel deprived of the standard of living they either feel entitled to, or need in order 
to survive (deprivation confl icts). 
4.4.3  Critique of Eco-scarcity Theory 
 Eco-scarcity theory is a logically sound extension of the original Malthusian frame-
work which, at least sometimes and in some places, applied before the advent of 
industrial civilization (LeBlanc  2003 ); would apply in the absence of industrial civi-
lization; and will again apply after its terminal demise. In the presence of industrial 
civilization, however, it is an easy target for empirical criticism. The reason for this 
is that, just as classical Malthusianism, eco-scarcity theory fails to account for the 
benefi cial systemic effects of industrial civilization (see Sect.  4.2.2 ). Due to this 
failure, it is easy for critics to come up with countervailing case studies to “falsify” 
eco-scarcity theory (e.g. Peluso and Watts  2001 ). 
 For the same reason, eco-scarcity theory can also be undermined by the applica-
tion of conventional statistical techniques. Here, the procedure is to collapse 
eco- scarcity models into bundles of causal factors, with violent confl ict as the 
dependent variable and environmental pressure as the independent variable of inter-
est. Factors intervening in eco-scarcity models, such as the strength of state institu-
tions, are added to the list of independent variables as “controls”. This reductive 
procedure makes it then possible to “test” via correlation analysis whether or not 
there is a connection between environmental pressure and violent confl ict. 
 While early quantitative scholarship seemed to confi rm the claim of a strong and 
signifi cant causal relationship between environmental pressure and violent confl ict, 
subsequent studies have undermined this belief. 11 Consider the fate of an early 
quantitative study that found a clear causal link between environmental pressures, 
such as land degradation and fresh water scarcity, and the risk of domestic armed 
confl ict (Hauge and Ellingsen  1998 ). Ten years after its publication, the study was 
replicated by another scholar—and most of its fi ndings turned out to be spurious 
(Theisen  2008 ). Overall, the balance of recent quantitative studies do not support 
the claim that environmental pressure has any statistically signifi cant causal effect 
on violent confl ict (Bernauer et al.  2012 ). 
 To be sure, the quantitative literature debunking eco-scarcity theory can itself be 
criticized. It is problematic to reduce complex social-ecological processes, with 
their multiple discontinuities and feedback mechanisms, to independent and depen-
dent variables. Insofar as environmental strains and population pressure are remote 
11
  See for example Urdal ( 2005 ); Binningsbø et al. ( 2007 ). 
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causes in complex social-ecological processes, it is unfair to place them alongside 
more proximate causes such as unequal distribution, ethnic hatred, or inadequate 
institutions. The danger of reductivism is occasionally recognized even by quantita-
tive scholars: “Conventional statistical techniques run into problems when the rela-
tionships to be investigated are of a complex and interactive kind, which is exactly 
the case for eco-scarcity theory” (Theisen  2008 , 814). 
 And yet, when measured against its own validity claims, eco-scarcity theory is in 
trouble. The absence of a strong and demonstrable statistical nexus linking environ-
mental pressure with violent confl ict questions the applicability of this complex 
neo-Malthusian school of thought to the analysis of confl ict patterns. 
 That said, however, it is important to recall that the criticism applies only to the 
recent past. It does not alter the fact that eco-scarcity scenarios may yet be borne out 
in the near future if industrial civilization enters a terminal decline. Just as the neo- 
Malthusian proponents of eco-scarcity theory fail to acknowledge that we are still 
living in the industrial age, their critics fail to appreciate that the durability of indus-
trial civilization cannot be taken for granted in a world entering various forms of 
geophysical turbulence. Climate change and energy scarcity, either to prevent cata-
strophic global warming or due to a terminal decline of global oil production, are 
dramatic game changers that may drive the world towards a post-industrial and 
post-global age where we may see precisely the complex neo-Malthusian scenarios 
that have so often been discarded (Friedrichs  2013 ). 
4.4.4  Climate-Based Eco-scarcity 
 If eco-scarcity theory is a logical extension of classical Malthusianism, then climate- 
based eco-scarcity is in turn a logical extension of eco-scarcity theory. In essence, it 
explores the multiple ways by which climate change may lead to environmental 
scarcity and, thereby, affect the likelihood of violent confl ict and other social prob-
lems through a variety of social mechanisms such as migration. 
 The academic debate about climate-based eco-scarcity is a kind of déjà vu in that 
it tracks the same trajectory as the previous debate about eco-scarcity theory. It 
started with some authors postulating a causal link between climate change and 
violent confl ict. As is typical for eco-scarcity theory, environmental migration was 
considered as an important intervening factor (Barnett and Adger  2007 ; Reuveny 
 2007 ). The specifi c causal mechanisms under scrutiny are also similar to those 
previously considered by eco-scarcity theorists. Let us take as an example the model 
outlined in Fig.  4.8 (source: Buhaug et al.  2010 , 82).
 Like eco-scarcity more generally, climate-based eco-scarcity was countered by 
arguments based on the statistical analysis of recent events and highlighting the 
absence of a strong and signifi cant causal link connecting climate change with 
violent confl ict (Raleigh and Urdal  2007 ; Theisen et al.  2012 ). Also like in the case 
of eco-scarcity, even authors representing the variable-based approach sometimes 
acknowledge that statistical models based on recent historical events are unable to 
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predict the confl ict dynamics to be expected under abrupt climate change: “We are 
only beginning to experience the physical changes imposed by global warming 
[…], so a lack of systematic association between the environment and armed con-
fl ict today need not imply that such a connection cannot materialize tomorrow” 
(Buhaug et al.  2010 , 93–94). 
 In fact, climate change of a magnitude similar to what is currently underway has 
not happened for at least a couple of centuries. Therefore, the statistical analysis of 
recent events is not empirically adequate to understand the effects of future climate 
change. Instead, we need to hark back to earlier historical episodes when societies 
were actually confronted with comparable climatic stresses. 
4.4.5  The Future in the Past 
 Climate-based eco-scarcity has been successfully applied in historical research. 
Most notably, Zhang and colleagues ( 2007 ,  2011 ) have looked at the period between 
1500 and 1800 to understand the social and political effects of climate change. 
Based on time series from the Northern Hemisphere, especially from Europe but 
also from China, Zhang et al. ( 2011 , 17298) have come up with a sophisticated 
causal model that is thoroughly grounded in empirical data (Fig.  4.9 ).
 The model is neatly illustrated by Europe’s “general crisis” of the seventeenth 
century. A drop in average temperature around 1560 was immediately followed by 
a reduction of bio-productivity, which negatively affected agricultural yields and 
thus food supply per capita. Over the next 30 years or so, this was followed by cas-
cading escalations of social unrest, migration, famine, war, epidemics, and wide-
spread malnutrition. From 1618, the crisis culminated in the Thirty Years War. 
Subsequent warfare, together with famines and epidemics, led to a considerable 





































































 When tested against data from the Northern Hemisphere more generally between 
1200 and 1800, the expectations derived from the model are largely confi rmed. The 
authors observe strikingly similar macro-patterns for regions as disparate as Europe 
and China, at a time when Europe and China were largely detached from one another 
both economically and politically. Zhang et al. ( 2007 ) suggest that this synchronic-
ity can hardly be explained unless one assumes that similar social mechanisms were 
triggered by similar climatic stresses. 12 
4.4.6  Science Integration 
 While the insights of Zhang and colleagues are of a heuristic nature, the interdisci-
plinary nature of a research program such as that suggested by Fig.  4.9 is obvious. 
It takes climatologists, ecologists, and agricultural experts to trace the links between 
climate change, reduced bioproductivity, and agricultural shortfalls. The link 
between agricultural production and food supply per capita must be unpacked by 
social scientists sensitive to political inequality. One level further down, when it 
comes to the study of social unrest, migration, and famine, we are entering the 
12
  While Zhang et al. have shown that social and political dislocations in the temperate regions of 
the Northern Hemisphere are mostly associated with climatic warming, others have demonstrated 
that the opposite holds for the tropics where warmer El Niño years have always been, and are still, 
associated with serious social and political trouble (Fagan  2009 ; Hsiang et al.  2011 ). 
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 Fig. 4.9  Causal pathways from climate change to large-scale human crisis 
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bailiwick of political scientists, economists, and sociologists. The study of war is 
the turf of international relations scholars, while epidemics and malnutrition are at 
the intersection of medical and social scientifi c disciplines. Demographers are 
 competent to study the dynamic of population decline. 
 Systems scientists and people trained in advanced computer technology would 
be needed to further refi ne the operationalization of the model. Because the model 
is supposed to work across time and space, historians and area specialists would 
obviously have to actively contribute at every stage of the research cycle. Ironically, 
however, empirically oriented multidisciplinary papers such as those by Zhang et al. 
are hardly ever discussed by disciplinary social scientists. 
 Why do “hard” scientists such as Zhang et al. come up with deductive models, 
rather than social scientists developing them inductively? It is too comfortable and 
surely not helpful for social scientists to accuse those who develop complex models 
of “environmental determinism” while digging in behind disciplinary walls. Social 
scientists would not have to agree with every detail of such models, but they could 
make important contributions to improving and refi ning them. 
4.4.7  Civilizational Neo-Malthusianism 
 Civilizational neo-Malthusianism is perhaps the most original modifi ed Malthusian 
theory. It states that a civilization’s problem solving capacity is depleted as social 
and technological complexity rises to unsustainable levels. 
 The classical statement is Joseph Tainter’s theory of the emergence, survival, and 
collapse of complex societies ( 1988 ). According to this theory, the fate of societies 
depends on their ability to adapt to emerging challenges either by an upgrade or by 
a voluntary downgrade of their systemic complexity. In general, upgrades are obvi-
ously the preferred option. They are particularly rewarding at the early stages of 
civilizational development, when the marginal cost of higher complexity is still low. 
Later on, the growing marginal cost of complexifi cation makes comparable upgrades 
gradually more expensive. The strategy of problem solving through complexifi ca-
tion becomes entirely punitive at the fi nal stages, when the return on investment in 
further complexity is negative. Tragically, however, the alternative option of volun-
tary simplifi cation is hardly available because advanced civilizations are not “down-
ward compatible”. They are incapable of a planned reduction of their level of 
complexity because the existing complexity represents indispensable solutions to 
real problems. Consequently, involuntary collapse is often the only way for the frag-
ments of the system to reach a new equilibrium. 
 The fundamental underlying point is that societies are always driven to respond 
to emerging problems (Wilkinson  1973 ). These problems can be either exogenous 
to the society in question, or they can be externalities produced by it. Either way, the 
logical answer is additional layers of complexity. Tragically, however, complexifi -
cation has diminishing returns because the easy fi xes are implemented fi rst. 
Moreover, increasing complexity implies increasing costs for the maintenance of 
J. Friedrichs
85
that complexity (Homer-Dixon  2006 ). When the capacity for problem solving has 
been depleted due to the declining returns on complexifi cation and the escalating 
cost for the maintenance of the existing level of complexity, only collapse remains 
because voluntary simplifi cation is not a feasible option. 
 The framework has sometimes been applied to the rise and fall of civilizations in 
history. For example, archaeologists such as Weiss ( 2000 ) and Ur ( 2010 ) have 
explained the rise and fall of ancient civilizations in Mesopotamia by the initial ability 
of these civilizations to respond to climatic stresses with more complexity, followed 
by a later inability to avoid collapse in the face of otherwise similar stresses 
(Fig.  4.10 , from Friedrichs  2013 , 62). 13 The theory can be adapted for the diagnosis 
of current predicaments such as anthropogenic climate change, energy scarcity, or 
fi nancial instability (Friedrichs  2013 , Ch. 3; Korowicz  2010 ,  2012 ).
4.5  The Role of Social Science 
 While natural science is a main driver of unsustainable patterns of industrial devel-
opment, it also acts as a catalyst for public awareness and political action to address 
the concomitant sustainability crisis (e.g. climate science). Social science, by contrast, 
more often than not plays a sedative role. For example, this is seen in energy studies 
where mainstream economists have largely defi ned away the problem of scarcity. 
Mainstream economists staunchly believe that the price mechanism invariably 
translates demand into supply. If a resource becomes more expensive, more of it 
13
  See the interesting edited volumes by McIntosh et al. ( 2000 ) and Costanza et al. ( 2007 ). See also 
the work by climate historians (Lamb  1977 ; Fagan  2004 ,  2008 ,  2009 ), as well as Chew ( 2007 , 
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will be produced—period. This axiomatic assumption is incompatible with the idea 
that there are physical limits to industrial growth. 14 
 Even social scientifi c fi elds explicitly dedicated to environmental issues have a 
poor record when it comes to preparing the world for the possible demise of industrial 
civilization. For example, environmental sociology develops policy suggestions for 
mainstream environmental policy rather than addressing the fundamental unsustain-
ability of industrial society. Similarly, the literature on ecological modernization 
and green growth pretends that industrial society can be made environmentally 
viable by technological innovation and incremental social and political reforms, 
while playing down the dreadful fact that the “treadmill of production” is going 
round and round while the planet is hopelessly in overshoot. 15 
 Even worse, social scientists have been complicit in subverting the notion of 
sustainability. Originally, sustainability was about socio-political and socioeco-
nomic regimes that are viable in the long run because they do not overstrain the 
environment. This is a vague regulative ideal that leaves many questions open, but 
it does imply that political and economic considerations ought to be subordinated to 
ecological concerns. But then the  Brundtland Report introduced the notion of 
sustainable development, based on the optimistic assumption that sustainability and 
development go together rather than contradicting each other (World Commission 
on Environment and Development  1987 ). This has led some social scientists to 
claim that sustainability has three pillars: environmental, economic, and social 
(Littig and Grießler  2005 ). 16 The implication is that, insofar as any economic or 
social retrenchment is anathema to markets and citizens, suggestions for environ-
mental sustainability that are not palatable to markets and societies must be seen as 
incompatible with the imperative of economic and social sustainability. This is 
exactly what the public and political decision makers like to hear, but as a result the 
original idea of environmental sustainability was turned on its head. 
 In principle, critical social scientists unsatisfi ed with the system-stabilizing role 
of mainstream social science can help us gain a better understanding of the current 
sustainability crisis and elucidate the moral dilemmas that make it so hard to address 
it. This does not automatically imply that the crisis can be overcome, but a better 
understanding of the predicament would be valuable in and of itself. Unfortunately, 
however, this is not how most critical social scientists are (re)acting. Instead, many 
have gone post-positivist. Rather than providing any guidance about the precise 
nature of the crisis and how it might be addressed, they develop sophisticated 
accounts of how industrial society engages in collective self-delusion (for a survey, 
14
  Following pioneers such as Karl William Kapp, Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen and E. F. Schumacher, 
proponents of ecological economics such as Herman Daly, Kenneth Boulding, Robert Costanza, 
H.T. Odum, and David Pimentel have not been able to pose a signifi cant challenge to mainstream 
economics. But note the important textbook by Ayres and Warr ( 2009 ). 
15
  On ecological modernization, see Mol and Jänicke ( 2009 ); for a critical survey, see Warner 
( 2010 ); on green growth, see Ekins ( 2000 ); on the treadmill of production, see Gould et al. ( 2004 ); 
see also Mol ( 2002 ). 
16
  For an ambitious (and upbeat) attempt by a physicist-turned-development-economist to translate 
this into practice, see Munasinghe ( 2009 ). 
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see Blühdorn  2010 ). There is nothing fundamentally wrong with this, but it cannot 
replace a direct focus on the problems themselves. 
4.6  Conclusion 
 Despite the considerable potential for science integration inherent in modifi ed 
Malthusian theories, mainstream social scientists are generally reluctant to engage 
in, or even consider, such research programs. To put it in the words of the anthro-
pologist Possehl: “We should stop thinking about the physical world and start looking 
at the fabric of society” (quoted in Lawler  2008 ). 
 Looking at the fabric of society is what social scientists have been doing all 
along, so what is the actual worry underlying Possehl’s statement? Quite obviously, 
it is fear of transdisciplinary hybridization or bastardization. Indeed, integration 
with other disciplines may be less desirable to most social scientists than suggested 
by solemn calls for inter- or multi-disciplinary collaboration. 
 The main impediment is a refusal on the part of social scientists to accept that 
societal change can be anything but endogenous to the social sphere (for a critique, 
see Sørensen  2008 ). Mainstream social science follows an increasingly counterpro-
ductive division of labor whereby physical scientists study the physical world and 
social scientists study the social world—as if the two were separate and not inter-
connected. Natural scientists mirror this by a concentration on physical processes, 
although some are open to neo-Malthusian theories and models. 
 The self-encapsulation of the social sciences works reasonably well in times of 
resource abundance and material affl uence. It is epitomized by economists reducing 
scarcity to a problem related to the allocation but not the physical availability of 
resources, and constructivists cordoning off their scholarship from the analysis of 
material factors and thus making social change endogenous to self-(re)producing 
patterns of human interaction. However, the separation between social and physical 
sciences rests on the cornucopian assumption that industrial society always expands 
and never contracts. Under conditions of abrupt climate change and looming energy 
scarcity, social scientists do themselves a disservice by dismissing “materialistic” 
theories as reactionary or deterministic. 
 Just like the intersubjective norms that are at the core of social constructiv-
ism, resources constrain and enable human action. Precisely for this reason, it is 
self- defeating for social scientifi c research to dismiss Malthusian hypotheses. 
Social scientists should seriously (re-)engage with modifi ed Malthusian theo-
ries. As we have, seen some pioneering work has already been done at the 
fringes of social science, leading to remarkably sophisticated causal models 
belying knee-jerk allegations of “environmental determinism”. Such research 
not only has the potential to better integrate the social and physical sciences, but 
it also provides a platform for better integration among social scientifi c disci-
plines. It is reasonable to assume that this would also make it easier to commu-
nicate the results to the public. 
4 Who’s Afraid of Thomas Malthus?
88
 Despite the considerable promise of modifi ed Malthusian theories, fundamental 
challenges remain. Most if not all existing Malthusian theories operate at the macro- 
level, whereas work on common-pool resources (Ostrom  1990 ) operates on a 
smaller scale. While work on common-pool resources can hardly be scaled up to the 
macro-level (Levin  2010 ), it is equally challenging to scale Malthusian theories 
down to the micro-level. Despite the best efforts made by the International 
Association for the Study of Society and Natural Resources, the greatest challenge 
remains to formulate convincing theories that work at an intermediate level, perhaps 
connecting Malthusian theories with work on common-pool resources. 
 Postscript 
 At a conference, one person from the audience objected that Malthusian theories 
were discredited because of repressive policies that had in the past been justifi ed in 
their name. This is a serious objection. Nevertheless, the complex neo-Malthusian 
theories presented in this chapter are a far cry from the original theory formulated 
by Thomas Malthus. Moreover, shall we not ask the tough questions because we 
fear that we might not like some of the answers? Is it not better to intrepidly con-
front those questions, precisely in order to ensure the humane character of the poli-
cies and intellectual frameworks formulated in response to them? 
 Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
Noncommercial License, which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in 
any medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited. 
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